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The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), the Honorable Ray Mabus, in an address 
to the Navy Energy Forum, announced as a new acquisition policy that the 
“lifetime energy cost of a building or a system, and the fully burdened cost of fuel 
in powering those, will be a mandatory evaluation factor used when awarding 
contracts.” Secretary Mabus went on to say, “we will also use the overall energy 
efficiency and the energy footprint of a competing company as an additional 
factor in acquisition decisions” (Mabus, 2009). Secretary Mabus made this 
announcement and shared three other green and efficiency goals for the 
Department of the Navy. His address now puts the onus on the Navy acquisition 
community to implement the broad policy goals that he outlined. A challenge to 
the community will be how to implement these goals with a uniform, objective, 
and definable standard that is able to withstand the scrutiny of congress, which 
requires full and open competition, the business models of the defense industry, 
and the legal challenges that are sure to follow as a result of competition. This 
project analyzes the challenges of implementing Secretary Mabus’s 
announcement. Our analysis further defines the problem, offers 
recommendations for proceeding, and suggests areas for further study. 
Specifically, in this project we first conduct a literature review in the areas 
of total ownership cost, including the fully burdened cost of fuel, and of 
measuring energy efficiency. We then lay out a methodology for examining the 
issues associated with the implementation of the SECNAV’s announcement. 
Next, we survey and analyze available private-industry practices in the areas of 
green procurement or managing energy efficiencies, looking for possible 
 vi
applications for the Department of the Navy. We then explore the issues involved 
with the implementation of the SECNAV’s policy by defining the elements of total 
ownership cost, delving deeper into the fully burdened cost of fuel, and 
examining the difficulties with quantifying the energy efficiencies of competing 
companies. Finally, we conclude the project with detailed recommendations for 
proceeding and suggestions for further study. 
After completing the project, the principle recommendation is that for Navy 
and Marine Corps acquisitions contractors put in place an energy management 
process rather than submit to an arbitrary yardstick for energy efficiency and 
footprint for their companies. 
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The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), the Honorable Ray Mabus, has put 
forth three areas that will be a priority for the Navy and Marine Corps throughout 
his tenure: energy reform, acquisition reform, and unmanned systems. In an 
address to the Navy Energy Forum in October 2009, Secretary Mabus made a 
major announcement that would propel key changes and provide ambitious goals 
to address two of his three areas of priority. From that major announcement, 
quoted below, new acquisition policy emerged: 
We are going to change the way the Navy and Marine Corps 
awards contracts. The lifetime energy cost of a building or a 
system, and the fully burdened cost of fuel in powering those, will 
be a mandatory evaluation factor used when awarding contracts. 
We are going to hold industry contractually accountable for meeting 
energy targets and system efficiency requirements. And we’re 
going to do more. We will also use the overall energy efficiency and 
the energy footprint of a competing company as an additional factor 
in acquisition decisions. We want industry to partner with us and 
take steps not just to provide us with more energy efficient 
products, but to produce those products in energy efficient ways. 
(Mabus, 2009) 
This announcement was accompanied by four additional green and efficiency 
goals for the Department of the Navy. These goals are as follows: 
• Demonstrate a green strike group by 2012. The ships of the strike 
group will be powered by either nuclear or biofuel. By 2016, deploy 
that strike group as the Great Green Fleet, composed of nuclear 
ships and surface combatants that will operate using hybrid 
electric-propulsion systems and biofuel. The aircraft in the Green 
Strike Group will also operate solely on biofuels. 
• Reduce the petroleum use in the commercial fleet of 50,000 
vehicles by 50% by the year 2015. This reduction will be achieved 
by replacing current vehicles with flex-fuel vehicles, hybrid electric 
vehicles, and neighborhood electric vehicles. 
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• Produce at least half the energy requirements for shore-based 
installations from alternative energy. Sources for this energy will 
include wind, solar, ocean, and geothermal power. 
• Secretary Mabus’s most important target is to increase reliance on 
alternative energy sources for ships, aircraft, tanks, vehicles, and 
shore installations. This overarching goal is currently 17% 
complete. He plans to raise this to 50% by 2020. (Mabus, 2009) 
These goals represent the impact that increased energy awareness is 
having across the entire federal government. The announcement of these goals 
in October was especially appropriate because it has been designated energy-
awareness month. President George H. W. Bush made the official declaration in 
1991, even though energy-awareness movements had been in practice since the 
early 1980s (DoE, 2009b). President Obama renewed energy-awareness in a 
press release dated October 2, 2009, in which he refocused the country’s 
attention on the importance of energy awareness. In this press release, he stated 
that the federal government would lead the way in using clean energy and in 
increasing energy efficiency (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009a). As the 
largest energy consumer in the United States, the federal government will be 
able to leverage its buying power to promote the movement toward green 
technologies and energy sources in the marketplace, helping to develop an 
American “green” enterprise. The government will foster this movement through 
grants, increased funding, job-training programs, and policies that support clean 
energy businesses. President Obama called the expected results “benefits to our 
economic recovery, our security, and our long-term prosperity” (Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2009b). This renewed focus moves the federal government 
toward a larger role in implementing President Obama’s desire to move to a 
green economy. The Secretary of the Navy is taking that role seriously, as his 
announcement on the new acquisition policy for the Navy and Marine Corps 
demonstrates.  
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B. DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
To understand the importance of the SECNAV’s new pronouncement on 
energy and energy-related guidelines as they relate to acquisition, a basic 
understanding of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) acquisition system and 
phases is needed. DoD acquisition has often been referred to as a system-of-
systems. Three decision-support systems combine to bring to life the processes 
of identifying capability needs, resourcing, and acquiring those capabilities for the 
DoD. Those decision support systems are the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS): the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution Process (PPB&E): and the Defense Acquisition System. JCIDS is a 
need-driven system: PPB&E is a biennial calendar-driven system and the 
Defense Acquisition System is an event-driven system. 
 
 
Figure 1.   DoD Decision Support Systems (From: DAU, 2010) 
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As shown in the Figure 1 above, it is only with the proper interaction between 
these systems that the DoD can make informed resource decisions. The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook defines the roles of the three decision support systems as 
follows: 
• JCIDS—a system that identifies, documents, and prioritizes 
warfighting needs from a joint perspective. JCIDS focuses on 
identifying current and future gaps in meeting joint warfighting 
missions and functions and then develops requirements for weapon 
systems to close those gaps. The JCIDS process is conducted 
under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which is 
chaired by the Vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
membership consists of the Vice Chiefs of Staff for the Army and 
Air Force, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. The guiding instruction for 
JCIDS is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 3170 
series.  
• PPB&E—a process that results in the allocation of resources for 
the DoD’s proposed budget. PPB&E consists of four different 
overlapping phases in which guidance provided from the Secretary 
of Defense in terms of priorities, policy, and strategy shapes each 
Service’s budget, and ultimately, the unified budget of the DoD. 
Additionally, the execution of the current budget, as approved by 
Congress and signed by the President, is managed within this 
system. DoD Directive 7045.14 serves as the governing instruction. 
• Defense Acquisition System—the management system for all 
DoD acquisition programs. It establishes the management 
guidance for turning the needs of the warfighter and technological 
opportunities into reliable, affordable and sustainable systems. It 
establishes different oversight requirements for programs based 
upon dollar amount, program complexity, and management 
interest. The system is governed by two instructions: DoD 
Directives 5000.01 (The Defense Acquisition System) and 
5000.02—(Operation of the Defense Acquisition System).  
Figure 2 shows the general framework for moving through the five phases 
of the defense acquisition process: (1) materiel solution analysis phase, (2) 
technology development phase, (3) engineering and manufacturing development 




Figure 2.   The Defense Acquisition Management System (From: USD (AT&L), 
2008) 
The SECNAV’s announcement regarding new acquisition policies for 
energy and energy-related matters most clearly affects the Defense Acquisition 
System. As we discussed earlier, the other two systems concern themselves with 
identifying capability gaps and resourcing programs to meet those gaps, while 
the Defense Acquisition System focuses on managing programs within allotted 
resources to meet the gaps identified and, fulfill the warfighters’ requirements. As 
such, the Defense Acquisition System provides the guidance under which 
programs will be run and along with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
contracts awarded for those programs—guidance that has now changed as a 
result of the SECNAV’s announcement.  
A deeper look at the Defense Acquisition System and its purpose is 
warranted to provide an understanding of the impact of the SECNAV’s 
announcement. That understanding begins with the guidance spelled out in DoD 




4.1 The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the nation's 
investments in technologies, programs, and product support 
necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and support 
the United States Armed Forces. The investment strategy of the 
Department of Defense shall be postured to support not only 
today's force, but also the next force, and future forces beyond that.  
4.2. The primary objective of Defense acquisition is to acquire 
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable 
improvements to mission capability and operational support, in a 
timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price. (USD (AT&L), 
2007) 
DoD Instruction 5000.02 lays out three overarching policies for achieving this 
purpose: flexibility, responsiveness, and innovation. It is also important to point 
out that acquisition and procurement are not synonyms that can be used 
interchangeably. Acquisition, in this case, refers to a process that encompasses 
an analysis of the requirement, design, engineering, test and evaluation, 
production, and operations and support of defense, or information-technology 
systems. Procurement is the act of buying goods and services for the 
government, which is only one of the many functions of the acquisition process. It 
is important to note that not all DoD procurements are subjected to the Defense 
Acquisition System and all the oversight requirements inherent in that process. It 
is only those procurements for weapons systems or weapons-related support 
systems or for information-technology systems that meet the required dollar 
thresholds or milestone decision authority interest to be designated an 
acquisition category program (ACAT) that are subject to the Defense Acquisition 
System. Table 1, from DoD Instruction 5000.02, illustrates the different 






Table 1.   Description and Decision Authority for ACAT I—III Programs (From: 
USD (AT&L), 2008) 
Acquisition 
Category  Reason for ACAT Designation  Decision Authority  
ACAT I  
• MDAP (section 2430 of Reference (k))  
o Dollar value: estimated by the USD(AT&L) to require an 
eventual total expenditure for research, development, test and 
evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million in fiscal year 
(FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of more than 
$2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars  
o MDA designation  
• MDA designation as special interest  
ACAT ID: USD(AT&L)  
ACAT IC: Head of the 
DoD Component or, if 
delegated, the CAE 
(not further delegable)  
ACAT IA1, 2  
• MAIS (Chapter 144A of Reference (k)): A DoD acquisition program 
for an Automated Information System3 (either as a product or a service) 
that is either:  
• Designated by the MDA as a MAIS; or  
• Estimated to exceed:  
o $32 million in FY 2000 constant dollars for all expenditures, 
for all increments, regardless of the appropriation or fund 
source, directly related to the AIS definition, design, 
development, and deployment, and incurred in any single fiscal 
year; or  
o $126 million in FY 2000 constant dollars for all 
expenditures, for all increments, regardless of the appropriation 
or fund source, directly related to the AIS definition, design, 
development, and deployment, and incurred from the beginning 
of the Materiel Solution Analysis Phase through deployment at 
all sites; or  
o $378 million in FY 2000 constant dollars for all 
expenditures, for all increments, regardless of the appropriation 
or fund source, directly related to the AIS definition, design, 
development, deployment, operations and maintenance, and 
incurred from the beginning of the Materiel Solution Analysis 
Phase through sustainment for the estimated useful life of the 
system.  




ACAT IAC: Head of the 
DoD Component or, if 
delegated, the CAE 
(not further delegable)  
ACAT II  
• Does not meet criteria for ACAT I  
• Major system  
o Dollar value: estimated by the DoD Component Head to 
require an eventual total expenditure for RDT&E of more than 
$140 million in FY 2000 constant dollars, or for procurement of 
more than $660 million in FY 2000 constant dollars (section 
2302d of Reference (k))  
o MDA designation4 (paragraph (5) of section 2302 of 
Reference (k))  
CAE or the individual 
designated by the 
CAE4  
ACAT III  
• Does not meet criteria for ACAT II or above  
• AIS that is not a MAIS  Designated by the CAE4  
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Acquisition 
Category  Reason for ACAT Designation  Decision Authority  
1. In some cases, an ACAT IA program, as defined above, also meets the definition of an MDAP. The 
USD(AT&L) shall be the MDA for such programs unless delegated to a DoD Component. The statutory 
requirements that apply to MDAPs and MAIS shall apply to such programs.  
2. The MDA (either the USD(AT&L) or, if delegated, the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO or another designee) shall 
designate MAIS programs as ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC. MAIS programs shall not be designated as ACAT 
II.  
3. Automated Information System: A system of computer hardware, computer software, data or 
telecommunications that performs functions, such as collecting, processing, storing, transmitting, and 
displaying information. Excluded are computer resources, both hardware and software, that are:  
a. an integral part of a weapon or weapon system;  
b. used for highly sensitive classified programs (as determined by the Secretary of Defense);  
c. used for other highly sensitive information technology programs (as determined by the 
ASD(NII)/DoD CIO); or  
d. determined by the USD(AT&L) or designee to be better overseen as a non-AIS program 
(e.g., a program with a low ratio of RDT&E funding to total program acquisition costs or that 
requires significant hardware development).  
4. As delegated by the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Military Department.  
Programs that meet the threshold listed in Table 1 will be subject to the 
phases of the Defense Acquisition System and their varying oversight 
requirements: (1) materiel solution analysis phase, (2) technology development 
phase, (3) engineering & manufacturing development phase, (4) production and 
deployment phase, and (5) operations and support phase. Each phase of the 
program corresponds to a stage of its lifecycle: (1) pre-systems acquisition 
(materiel solution analysis phase, technology development phase), (2) systems 
acquisition (engineering and manufacturing development phase, production and 
deployment phase), and (3) sustainment (operations and support phase). The 
SECNAV’s announcement most clearly affects guidance and policy for the pre-
systems acquisition and systems acquisition stage in a program’s lifecycle 
development while the benefits of the energy efficiencies are not typically seen 
until the sustainment stage of the system’s lifecycle.  
C. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SYSTEM: FULL & OPEN 
COMPETITION, MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR 
SMALL BUSINESS, AND OTHER PUBLIC-POLICY OBJECTIVES 
According to Garrett (2007) in World Class Contracting, a normal business 
analyzing a procurement program would focus on speed to market, cost 
reduction, and requirement satisfaction. The Department of Defense focuses on 
these areas within statutory and regulatory guidelines while also adding to the 
 9
mix other important public-policy objectives/goals and requirements. The FAR is 
the primary governing regulation for federal executive agencies in the acquisition 
process (and procurement process) of goods and services with appropriated 
funds. According to FAR 1.102, “the vision for the Federal Acquisition System is 
to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the customer, 
while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy objectives” (GSA et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, the FAR states the following with regard to public-policy 
objectives: “(d) fulfill public policy objectives. The system must support the 
attainment of public policy goals adopted by the Congress and the President. In 
attaining these goals, and in its overall operations, the process shall ensure the 
efficient use of public resources” (GSA et al., 2009).  
In an article in Defense Acquisition Technology & Logistics (AT&L), 
Krieger and Wood (2009) investigated the claim that if the DoD operated as a 
business, then its acquisition system and project management would function 
more effectively. In response to this claim, they stated the following as one of the 
reasons the DoD is not like a business: “as a large spender of taxpayer funds, 
[the] DoD is often the tool for implementing public policy—some having little to do 
with good business decisions or generating effective national defense” (p. 10). 
They went on to state that implementing public policy, “may contribute to the 
public good, but they [the DoD] do so in ways that no smart business would 
operate” (p. 10). 
Given that the DoD does not function as a business and that instead it 
takes into consideration additional factors in support of public-policy objectives 
that may run contrary to good business practices, it becomes beneficial to define 
public-policy objectives/goals. In FAR 1.102-2(d), as stated above, public-policy 
goals are goals that Congress and the President adopt. This regulation commits 
the acquisition system to implementing and attaining such objectives as 
Congress and the President shall define. Existing socio-economic programs are  
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good examples of public-policy goals and how they have been implemented. In 
fact, the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines socio-economic programs 
in the following manner: 
[Socio-economic are] programs that are incorporated into the 
procurement process to foster the achievement of national goals. 
The government utilizes its purchasing power as a means of 
promoting public policies. Government contracts attempt to further 
such national goals as fostering small business, overcoming 
regional unemployment, assisting minority workers, giving 
preference to domestic and other special sources, ensuring fair 
treatment of employees, maintaining integrity and fair competitive 
practices, and protecting the environment. (2009) 
We could use a similar definition for a public-policy objective. As stated in the 
definition by the DAU, the government uses the purchasing power of the 
acquisition process to issue contracts in an effort to further national goals, and, in 
some instances, these contracts are issued without regard to the best or the 
most advantageous price for the government. The government has laid out a 
number of socio-economic categories, generally subject to oversight by the Small 
Business Administration, that fulfill important public-policy requirements and have 
established goals for each requirement category. Figure 3 details some of these 




Figure 3.   Socio-economic Programs (From: DAU, 2010) 
Prior to the SECNAV’s announcement on energy and energy-related 
mandatory evaluation factors, the federal government was pursuing public policy 
goals in the area of energy efficiency. FAR 23 details a number of initiatives for 
the government in the areas of energy and water conservation. FAR 23.202 
states the policy as follows: 
The government’s policy is to acquire supplies and services that 
promote energy and water efficiency, advance the use of 
renewable energy products, and help foster markets for emerging 
technologies. This policy extends to all acquisitions, including those 
below the simplified acquisition threshold. (GSA et al., 2009)  
This policy statement introduces to government acquisitions the public-policy 
goal of fostering markets for emerging technologies. This goal is similar in nature 
to President Obama’s desire to use the acquisition processes of the Federal 
government to spur movement away from fossil fuels and towards renewable 
energy and the green economy. FAR 23 lays out requirements for the acquisition 
of electronic items within the Federal Energy Star Program and Federal Energy 
Management Program, provides a preference for bio-based products, and 
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authorizes the use of energy savings performance contracts. The SECNAV’s 
announcement on energy and energy-related matters reaches further than FAR 
23 by extending energy requirements to be mandatory decision factors for Navy 
acquisitions.  
D. A WARFIGHTER’S REQUIREMENT 
In his book, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian 
Army, (Engels 1978) describes one of Alexander the Great’s greatest strengths 
as the speed with which he could maneuver. Alexander the Great significantly 
limited the number of non-combatants who traveled with the army and kept the 
combat train (logistics tail) as small as possible, thus ensuring the speed of his 
army. He did this by limiting the supplies that would be carried by pack animals, 
reducing the ratio of servants to combatants to 1-to-4, and requiring his 
soldiers—rather than slaves—to carry their own gear. As Engels states: 
Because many supplies were carried by the troops and a restricted 
number of servants, the Macedonian army would need far fewer 
pack animals than another contemporary force carrying an 
equivalent weight of baggage, and hence the problems of acquiring 
sufficient numbers of animals and feeding them were also reduced. 
The restricted use of carts would not only increase the army’s 
mobility in rough terrain but also reduce the number of drivers and 
the need to carry or acquire replacement parts and lumber for 
repairs—an important consideration in the treeless areas of eastern 
Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. In short, the logistics organization 
of Alexander’s army was brilliantly adapted for campaigning in Asia, 
where the acquisition of pack animals and provisions would often 
be difficult in barren terrain and where speed and mobility were 
frequently important tactical advantages. (p. 24)  
In Alexander the Great’s time, the concern about logistics was with the combat 
train and the ability of that train to deliver food—the fuel for the army and pack 
animals—without limiting the range, mobility, and speed of the army. Today, that 
fear about the limits of the combat train still exists, and the modern combat train 
must provide greater amounts of fuel for the increasingly fuel-guzzling systems 
that are in use at the front lines, both for combat and support purposes.  
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As a recent example, in testimony provided to the House Committee on 
Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, Chris Dipetto (2008), the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition & Technology (A&T), recounted that in 
2006 Major General Zilmer, while commander of U.S. forces in Al Anbar Province 
in Iraq, had issued a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) statement to the 
Joint Staff. This JUON statement requested sustainable—energy equipment for 
his forward-operating bases. The general recognized that a vulnerability existed 
with the fuel-supply delivery system for his generators. Additionally, the General 
recognized that he was being forced to pull combat troops from offensive 
missions in order to ensure the protection of the fuel convoys. This shifting of 
personnel led to a decrease in the combat power available for offensive missions 
at the time. These examples highlight the impact and vulnerabilities of a force 
that requires a large logistics tail. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE THAT REFORMS WILL PLAY IN THE ACQUISITION 
PROCESS 
Two imperatives exist, both with potential secondary benefits, that have 
driven the DoD, and specifically the Navy, to consider energy-related criteria in 
the acquisition process. The first is in direct response to a warfighter’s need to 
drive down the cost and size of a vulnerable logistics tail, and the second, which 
is discussed later in the project, is to drive down the total ownership costs of 
weapons and information systems over their lifecycle. It is important to begin the 
assessment of energy and its cost early during the acquisition process while 
planners are still able to address factors influencing the total ownership cost of 
the system. The factors influencing the total ownership cost of a system are set, 
with little room for movement, at the critical design review during the early stage 
of the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the Defense 
Acquisition System. At this point, the product baseline is set, the final design by 
product specifications, which is a significant controlling cost driver for total 
ownership cost. This product baseline will serve as the basis for going forward in 
the acquisition process. While the cost factors are set early in the acquisition 
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process or lifecycle of a system, the majority of the costs for the system and its 
lifecycle occur during the operations and support phase of the acquisition 
process. Estimates for the percentage of cost tied to a system’s operations range 
upwards of 70 percent. With increasing strains anticipated on future DoD 
budgets, placing limits on these total ownership costs is a strategic imperative for 
the Navy. 
In the Defense Acquisition System, there exist two main areas in which 
the DoD could consider lifetime energy costs including the fully burdened cost of 
fuel in the acquisition process for its weapon systems, platforms, and information 
systems. One of these areas is in the materiel solution analysis phase. During 
the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), the lifetime energy cost including the fully 
burdened cost of fuel can be weighed against the requirement for the capability. 
In other words, during the AoA they are looking at the benefits of the capability 
and weighing them against the burdens created by fielding the capability. Once 
the capability requirement is verified during the AoA the second area is during 
the competition for that capability requirement when contractors can be forced to 
compete to offer the most energy-efficient solution and, therefore, the system 
with the lowest lifetime energy cost. Previous studies have focused on the fully 
burdened cost of fuel and its implication during the AoA. This project will takes 
advantage of those studies in as much as they suggested a metric for 
determining or verifying the lifecycle energy cost of a system. 
The Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus, directed that 
lifecycle energy cost including the fully burdened cost of fuel and the energy 
efficiencies of competing companies become mandatory evaluation factors when 
the government awards contracts. This requirement now puts the onus on the 
Navy acquisition community to put into practice the broad policy goals Secretary 
Mabus outlined. A challenge to the acquisition community will be how to 




able to withstand the scrutiny of companies competing for Navy acquisition 
dollars and the court challenges that are sure to follow as a result of that 
competition. 
This project addresses the issues involved with the implementation of the 
SECNAV’s policy establishing mandatory evaluation factors for the lifecycle 
energy costs and the energy footprints of companies competing for contract 
awards. We examined these issues by defining the elements of total ownership 
cost, the fully burdened cost of fuel, and quantifying the energy footprints of 
competing companies. Additionally, we surveyed and analyzed available private-
industry and other government agencies practices for green procurement and for 
defining energy efficiencies in order to evaluate their possible relevance to the 
Department of the Navy. 
This project conducted a literature review in the areas of total ownership 
cost, including fully burdened cost of fuel, and measuring energy efficiency. In 
light of the elements involved with implementing the SECNAV’s acquisition 
policy, the objectives for this project were as follows: 
• Add definition to the complexity of implementing the SECNAV’s 
policy announcement, 
• Produce recommendations for how to proceed with the 
implementation of the new acquisition policy as defined in the 
SECNAV’s announcement, and 
• Make recommendations for areas of further study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the SECNAV’s speech to the Navy Energy Forum, 
breaking down his pronouncement on energy initiatives for acquisition into 
separate topics in order to facilitate a discussion of relevant existing literature. In 
this chapter, we break down the SECNAV’s energy initiative into the following 
two areas: total ownership cost including the fully burdened cost of fuel, and 
energy efficiency measurement. We chose these areas because they line up 
directly with the new mandatory evaluation factors that the SECNAV announced. 
We begin the chapter begins by examining in more detail the speech given by 
the SECNAV announcing the energy initiatives. We then discuss a sampling of 
available literature in the areas of total ownership cost, including the fully 
burdened cost of fuel, and energy efficiency measurement. In this discussion, we 
will include a survey of the available pertinent literature in order to provide a 
basis for understanding the issues involved. 
A. SECNAV SPEECH TO NAVAL ENERGY FORUM 
The SECNAV’s speech to the Naval Energy Forum, and specifically his 
announcement of energy and energy-related criteria becoming mandatory 
decision factors for Navy acquisitions, was the catalyst for this project. Thus, it is 
appropriate to start with a more detailed look at the SECNAV’s speech. 
During the speech, the SECNAV laid out three areas in which he will focus 
his leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps throughout his tenure: energy 
reform, acquisition reform, and unmanned systems. The speech to the Naval 
Energy Forum focused on energy and the importance that energy will play at a 
strategic, operational, and tactical level. Secretary Mabus laid out his case on 
energy and the importance of changing the mindset when it comes to energy. He 




certain extent we have ceded a strategic resource [energy/oil]—one that is 
difficult to guarantee—to other nations. We have ceded this to other nations who 
are allowed to exert disproportionate influence as a result” (Mabus, 2009). 
The speech then went on to detail the history of innovation in the Navy for 
powering ships, advancing from sails to coal and then to oil. In detailing these 
shifts, Secretary Mabus compared the challenge of implementing these new 
ideas to the challenges that need to be overcome today. In talking about the 
present day, Secretary Mabus mentioned several initiatives underway to reform 
the Navy’s energy practices: an F/A-18 engine that was tested running on 
biofuels, and the plan to install in more ships a hybrid propulsion system like that 
on the USS MAKIN ISLAND. Secretary Mabus concluded his speech by laying 
out goals. These goals are mentioned in the previous chapter under section A, 
Background. The goals reflect his vision of where he plans to take the Navy and 
Marine Corps in the area of energy reform in the future. The first goal touches 
two of Secretary Mabus’s three primary areas, including energy reform and 
acquisition reform, which is the focus of this project.  
The first goal that the SECNAV announced is that the lifetime energy cost, 
including the fully burdened cost of fuel, and the energy efficiency and footprint of 
competing companies would be mandatory evaluation criteria for the award of 
contracts. For the purpose of this literature review, we will break down this goal 
into the following areas: total ownership cost, including the fully burdened cost of 
fuel, and energy efficiency measurement. Next, we will cover in the literature 
review total ownership cost, including the fully burdened cost of fuel. Because the 
fully burdened cost of fuel is a component of total ownership cost, we have 




B. TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST INCLUDING THE FULLY BURDENED 
COST OF FUEL 
With uncertain budget outlooks, efforts to derive the total ownership cost 
of the systems and weapons that the DoD and the Navy buy have only now 
come to the forefront. Due to the increasing energy demands of the weapons that 
the DoD has fielded, the DoD has also increased its attempt to quantify that 
energy demand in dollars as a portion of the total lifecycle cost of a weapon 
system or platform. What follows is a survey of the most commonly cited studies 
in this area. All of these studies point to the fact that the DoD and the Navy have 
systematically underestimated the cost of owning the weapon systems and 
platforms that they procure and maintain. Much of this underestimation is a result 
of their failure to take into account secondary, indirect, and tertiary costs—
specifically those costs associated with the fully burdened cost of fuel, which can 
raise the overall costs exponentially depending on circumstances of the system’s 
delivery. 
Some of the items that make up the secondary and tertiary costs of fully 
burdened fuel include the following: transportation from source to end-user, 
security, equipment, infrastructure, training, actual delivery system, and 
maintenance of the delivery system. These secondary and tertiary costs, added 
to the commodity price of fuel, make up the fully burdened cost of fuel and lead 
to a more realistic picture of the total ownership cost over the lifecycle of the 
weapon system or platform. 
1. More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden, 
Report of the Defense Science Board, May 2001 
In June, then Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (AT&L) Jacques Gansler issued a mandate for the formation of a 
Defense Science Board (DSB) to study and identify technologies that improve 
fuel efficiency across the portfolio of DoD weapon systems and to assess various 
impacts across a range of scenarios. Specifically, the mandate charged the 
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Board to “identify fuel-efficient technologies (broadly defined to include new or 
improved fuels, engines, Alternative Fueled Vehicles, and other advanced 
technologies) throughout research, development, test and evaluation pipeline, 
with an emphasis on those with greatest potential to begin implementation within 
the next 10 years” (DSB, 2001). The board evaluated the technologies based on 
four categories: operations, logistics, costs, and environment. 
Among the findings of their report was the DoD’s practice of basing fuel 
price on the wholesale price of fuel and not on its delivered, or fully burdened, 
price. Thus, the DoD was not basing acquisition decisions on true costs and, 
therefore, was not rewarding efficiency innovations or penalizing inefficiencies. 
The study specifically pointed out figures from the Defense Energy Supply 
Center (DESC), which establishes the DoD-wide standard per-gallon fuel price. A 
price of $1.337 was established for fiscal year 2002. The true cost of these fuels 
is much higher despite the DESC price. It costs an estimated $17.50 per gallon 
for USAF worldwide tanker-delivered fuel and hundreds of dollars per gallon for 
Army forces deep into the battlespace. The report states, “these costs are not 
used in the economic analyses that form the basis for efficient investment 
decisions, which results in sub-optimal allocation of resources” (DSB, 2001). 
As a result of these findings, the DSB recommended, among other things, 
that the DoD use the fully burdened cost of fuel in its investment decisions. It also 
concluded that the DoD should strengthen the link in the acquisition process 
between identifying the advantages (and quantifying those advantages) gained 
by fuel efficiencies to the four areas mentioned above: operations, logistics, 
costs, and environment.  
2. More Fight–Less Fuel: Report of the DSB on DoD Energy 
Strategy, February 2008 
In 2006, another DSB was formed with the mandate to once again 
examine the DoD’s energy practices and set a strategy for moving into the future. 
The findings from this DSB were consistent with those of the first Board in that 
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the fully burdened cost of fuel was still not playing an informative role in resource 
allocation. As a result, the DoD was making decisions not knowing the full extent 
of the consequences of those decisions in terms of budget, or the effects of those 
decisions on operations and force planning. Additionally, without a consistent 
methodology to identify the fully burdened cost of fuel and the risk associated 
with the energy demands of its weapons systems, the DoD was not able to take 
proper advantage of the trade space in the acquisition process. Other findings in 
their report concluded that the DoD’s efforts in managing its energy were 
“currently limited to complying with executive orders, legislation and regulations, 
which are mostly limited to facilities, non-tactical fleet vehicles, purchase of 
renewable energy from utilities, and procurement of commercial products” (DSB, 
2008). The report attributed these efforts to the fact that a senior political 
appointee was not responsible for energy and that the efforts in compliance 
made up a quarter of the DoD’s energy consumption. 
The DSB concluded in its 2008 report that the DoD faced two primary 
energy challenges: an unnecessarily high and growing fuel demand in the 
battlespace, and a military-installation dependence on commercial power that is 
fragile and vulnerable. As a result, the DSB once again recommended that the 
DoD base its acquisition decisions on the fully burdened cost of fuel and that it 
further develop the necessary analytical capabilities to quantify the value of the 
fully burdened cost of fuel. It further recommended that the DoD accomplish this 
goal by strengthening the link to energy factors in the acquisition process through 
the establishment of key energy-performance parameters, and by using the fully 
burdened cost of fuel to inform all trade-offs. 
3. Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, JASON the MITRE 
Corporation, September 2006 
In 2006, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) 
charged JASON with examining ways to reduce the DoD’s dependence on fossil 
fuels. In its findings, the report concluded that there was no expectation of any 
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prolonged shortages of petroleum based fuels in the next 25 years and that any 
short-term shortages would be a result of refinery capacity issues. Additionally, 
the report found that while fuel charges were only approximately 3% of the total 
DoD budget, there were still “compelling reasons” to reduce the DoD’s 
dependence on fossil fuels. The report stated: 
Even though fuel is only a relatively small fraction of the total DoD 
budget, there are several compelling reasons to minimize DoD fuel 
use: 
a. Fuel costs represent a large fraction of the 40–50 
year life-cycle costs of mobility aircraft and non-
nuclear ships. Note that this is consistent with the life-
cycle costs of commercial airliners. 
b. Fuel use is characterized by large multipliers and 
co-factors: at the simplest level, it takes fuel to deliver 
fuel. 
c. Fuel use imposes large logistical burdens, 
operational constraints and liabilities, and 
vulnerabilities: otherwise capable offensive forces can 
be countered by attacking more-vulnerable logistical-
supply chains. Part of this is because of changes in 
military doctrine. In the past, we used to talk of the 
“front line,” because we used to talk of the line that 
was sweeping ahead, leaving relatively safe terrain 
behind. This is no longer true. The rear is now 
vulnerable, especially the fuel supply line. 
d. There are anticipated, and some already imposed, 
environmental regulations and constraints. Not least, 
because of the long life of many DoD systems. 
e. Uncertainties about an unpredictable future make it 
advisable to decrease DoD fuel use to minimize 
exposure and vulnerability to potential unforeseen 
disruptions in world and domestic supply. (JASON, 
2006) 
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In its conclusion, the JASON report continued with the theme introduced in 
the DSB reports by stating that the DoD needed to maintain development of its 
analytical processes in order to be able to drive the estimates needed to make 
accurate and thoughtful resource decisions. The report specifically mentioned 
commercially available equipment, such as that on General Motors vehicles’ ON-
STAR, as a way in which the DoD could drill down into individual items to find 
actual efficiencies and use that information in forming and verifying its estimates. 
Additionally, the report stated that supply interruptions of fossil fuels would not be 
a deciding factor in military operations, but that the warfighter’s needs for 
improved logistical and military requirements and capabilities and the 
requirement to hold costs down should be the factors forcing the DoD’s hand in 
adopting an energy-efficiency metric or mindset. 
4. Overarching Organizational Framework Needed to Guide and 
Oversee Energy Reduction Efforts for Military Operations, 
Government Accountability Office, March 2008 
In 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of 
the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC) Readiness Subcommittee, 
issued a report on the DoD’s efforts to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels. In its 
report, the committee commented on many of the DoD’s efforts to implement 
projects that would reduce fossil fuels. Specifically, the report mentioned the fact 
that energy transformation made the 2007 list of top departmental transformation 
priorities. The report also mentioned an update to the Joint Staff policy governing 
the development of capability documents for weapons systems. The policy 
requires energy efficiency and that it be selectively considered as a key 
performance parameter (KPP). The report goes on to detail a project that each of 
the services has implemented in order to cut fossil-fuel dependence. 
However, in keeping with the trend in the DSB reports, the GAO faulted 
the DoD for its failure to have an overarching organizational framework to guide, 
coordinate, and oversee all these efforts. In echoing the 2008 DSB report, which 
called for a senior political appointee to oversee efforts, the GAO stressed the 
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importance of a single contact in order to ensure accountability—one who has 
the authority to usher in DoD wide goals. Additionally, the GAO faulted the DoD 
for its failure to establish a framework for implementing a KPP for fuel efficiency 
in acquiring its weapon system, again echoing earlier DSB reports. 
Until now, the focus of this literature review has been on weapon systems, 
platforms, or buildings, and the fully burdened cost of fuel and total ownership 
cost in powering these items. The fully burdened cost of fuel and total ownership 
cost are areas in which extensive research has been documented and carried 
out to define and produce metrics or calculators in order to estimate the costs 
involved. Our focus will now turn to the production of these items and how to 
measure and define the energy efficiencies, or footprints, of competing 
companies in a manner consistent with congressional policies of full and open 
competition, maximum practicable opportunity for small business, and support for 
domestic industrial base.  
C. MEASURING ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
Measuring the energy efficiencies, or footprints, of competing companies 
is an area in the literature that has not received the same treatment as total 
ownership cost and the fully burdened cost of fuel. The factors involved in 
monitoring the energy efficiency of companies in the production and 
manufacturing of their products has not been well developed. Additional troubles 
exist in the availability and access to data. For the sake of comparison, the DoD 
can monitor and initiate actions to improve the energy efficiencies of its buildings 
or tents by adding insulation, by installing newer and more efficient lighting, or by 
improving the HVAC systems for its buildings, but it does not necessarily have 
access to similar information regarding contractor practices. Additionally, 
externalities to the production process, such as weather and location are able to 
play an inordinate role if proper accounting that equalizes these externalities 
does not occur. 
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1. Take the Stairs—Be More Energy Efficient, Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration, June 2000 
This short article from the Department of Energy (DoE) Web site laid out 
some issues to consider in order to arrive at a metric for measuring energy 
efficiency. The article pointed out that there is not a single commonly accepted 
definition for what constitutes energy efficiency. According to the article, some 
would define energy efficiency as an increase in output for a given level of 
energy input, or the same output for a given decrease in energy input. The article 
further states that the most accepted definition for energy efficiency is actually 
energy “intensity.” The article then defined energy intensity as the ratio of energy 
consumption to some measure of demand for energy services. The article 
pointed out the weakness in this measurement in that this ratio cannot account 
for externalities, such as weather and location. 
2. The Industrial Sector, DoE–Energy Information Administration, 
October 1999 
In the chapter contents of this source, the DoE attempted to lay out a 
methodology to tie energy efficiency to energy intensity. The chapter pointed out 
that since 1980, the value of industrial output for the United States has 
continuously increased while the value of total energy consumed by the industrial 
sector has fallen. This change would seem to indicate an increase in efficiency, 
but it fails to take into account externalities, such as a switch to a more service-
oriented economy. Such externalities may reduce the real value of any gain or 
decrease in efficiency measured.  
The chapter then detailed data available in the Manufacturing Energy 
Consumption Survey (MECS), which detailed national-level data on energy-
related information for the manufacturing sector. The MECS provided three 
measures, each differing in how treatment of off-site energy, feedstock, and 
byproduct energy was accounted for. The chapter then detailed the weaknesses 
inherent in this method because non-manufacturing factors had not been 
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developed. Additionally, due to the output being tied to currency, it was subject to 
change when the currency market fluctuated, and thus would not necessarily 
indicate an increase or decrease in efficiency. 
3. Green Building in Government Construction Contracting, 
American Bar Association  
In the area of evaluating the energy footprint and efficiencies of a 
manufacturer’s facilities, the government has set the example of the codes it 
expects manufacturers to follow by adopting these codes for its own buildings. As 
of January 24, 2007, through Executive Order 13423, the Federal government 
required that new construction of government buildings meet green 
requirements. This policy requires that construction meet green building 
standards and use energy-efficient technologies in the improvements of existing 
buildings. The United States Green Building Counsel (USGBC), a non-
governmental organization (NGO), has developed nationally accepted standards 
for green buildings through the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) certification. This certification has three levels and is based on an 
evaluation of five factors: (1) sustainable site development, (2) water savings, (3) 
energy efficiency, (4) materials selection, and (5) quality of the indoor 
environment. Buildings are certified if they meet the minimum requirements in 
each area. The USGBC can award additional credit for added performance or 
innovation in design. It evaluates all submissions based on documentation and 
not by inspection or validation. A LEED certification is available for building 
modifications and renovations, as well as for new construction. However, there is 
no legal enforcement or consequences imposed by the government for failing to 
meet the requirements. 
As a nationally accepted standard, this rating system could be applied as 
evaluation criteria for awarding government contracts to potential offerors. 
However, many government contractors have facilities that were erected prior to 
this policy. To compete under the energy footprint aspect, companies can submit 
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for a LEED certification as new renovations are made. This may be 
accomplished by submitting the original building documents of the existing 
structure for LEED certification or submitting the building documents to new 
facilities they have under consideration. There are some potential drawbacks, 
however, because it may not be cost effective for a contractor to demolish 
existing buildings or renovate sections to make room for new, more efficient 
improvements on the off-hand chance of being awarded a contract. Another 
possible consideration is how the cost of the facility will be distributed to the 
government in cost-reimbursement contracts. While the facility may have a lower 
overhead than one that is not “green,” it may have a higher cost of construction, 
which is being levied on the government, and, thus, would represent an overall 
drain on the total ownership cost. 
In concluding the literature review, it is apparent that measuring the 
energy efficiencies of competing companies is very much an area in flux. Unlike 
those studies that considered the total ownership cost and fully burdened cost of 
fuel, few studies have extensively looked at these areas and examined how to 
objectively identify and account for competing companies’ strengths and 
weaknesses.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A methodology is a systematic approach for organizing and addressing a 
problem. In this chapter, we describe the methodology we used to conduct an 
analysis of the Navy implementing lifetime energy cost, including the fully 
burdened cost of fuel, and energy footprints of contractors as mandatory decision 
factors in contract award. The literature review contributed to this analysis and 
formed the basis for further study. The literature review contained a survey of the 
available literature as it applied to the topic. Following the literature review, we 
examined a sampling of private and government-agency practices in order to 
determine their applicability to the Navy. Next, we took the SECNAV’s energy 
criteria and defined the elements involved with the criteria. We concluded our 
analysis with our findings, and offered our recommendations for moving forward.  
A. DEFINITION 
We explored the issues involved with the implementation of the 
SECNAV’s policy by first defining the elements of total ownership cost, the fully 
burdened cost of fuel, and quantifying energy efficiencies of competing 
companies. We then examined the definitions of the elements that comprise the 
different aspects of the SECNAV’s policy announcement in order to highlight the 
issues involved in implementing the SECNAV policy. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Finally, the project wrapped up with our findings and recommendations for 
proceeding. In light of the elements involved with implementing the SECNAV’s 





• Add a clarifying definition to the complexity of implementing the 
SECNAV’s policy announcement, 
• Produce recommendations for how to proceed with the 
implementation of the new acquisition policy as defined in the 
SECNAV’s announcement, and 
• Make recommendations for areas of further study. 
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IV. PRIVATE/PUBLIC ORGANIZATION ENERGY PRACTICES: 
ARBITRARY YARDSTICK VS. ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS 
In looking at implementing a policy or process that deals with methods, 
measurements, and requirements that are still in the early stage of development, 
such as the energy and energy-efficiency requirements of the SECNAV’s new 
policy, it is important to conduct a survey of available information to discover if 
anyone else is currently addressing the issue(s), and if they are, to discover how 
they are addressing the issue(s) involved so that we can learn from their efforts. 
Energy is an issue that affects organizations that are private, as well as public 
and thus they present opportunities for the Navy to examine how those 
organizations are addressing the issue of energy for applicability to the Navy’s 
needs. 
The energy issue touches the private sector because, beyond any sense 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR), in the pursuit of maximizing profit, 
corporations are incentivized, at least theoretically, to produce their goods or 
services in the most efficient manner. In achieving this most efficient manner it 
would be expected that corporations have developed or adopted metrics and 
standards by which they could measure the energy efficiency of the products 
they produce and use, as well as measure the energy efficiency of their 
manufacturing process in producing those products or providing their service. If 
such metrics and standards have been developed, then they would serve as a 
starting point on which the Navy could base evaluation requirements for the new 
energy criteria as mandated by the SECNAV. 
Further, public-sector organizations also serve as valid models for the 
Navy to study because they are dealing with the same policy environment that is 
driving the Navy to focus on energy, even if they do not duplicate the exact 
policy. Looking at how other public organizations respond to that policy 
environment can help signify the importance of various measurements in 
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achieving the Navy’s goals and possibly provide input for the metrics necessary 
for the Navy to evaluate the energy criteria as directed by the SECNAV. In this 
chapter, we will focus on various efforts taking place in the private and public 
sectors to deal with energy and energy efficiency. 
A. PRIVATE SECTOR 
1. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a non-
governmental organization (NGO) based in Geneva, Switzerland, that identifies 
standards that are required by businesses, governments, and societies. 
According to the ISO Web site, the scope of these standards spans the definition 
of state-of-the-art products, services, processes, materials and systems, as well 
as the definition for good conformity assessment, managerial and organizational 
practices (ISO, 2006). The ISO develops the standards they identify in 
partnership with representatives from governments and businesses that work or 
are involved with the sector the standard will be used in. After the standard has 
been developed and a period of time has been allowed for comments, the 
standard is then voted on by the membership of the ISO. As a result, although 
ISO standards are voluntary, they are widely respected by both the public and 
private sector due to their broad base of support and development. The ISO does 
not carry out certification for its standards or control those organizations who do, 
but it has developed “a “toolbox” of ISO standards and guides for conformity 
assessment—covering all aspects from supplier’s declaration of conformity to 
third-party certification and accreditation—which is becoming a vital component 
of business transactions, global trade and regulatory requirements” (ISO, 2006). 
According to the ISO Web site, there are over 18,000 standards that are in 
place today (ISO, n.d.d.). These standards are often technical documents that 
run the gamut from ensuring interchangeability to ensuring that the 
manufacturing of products is done in a safer, cleaner, and more efficient manner. 
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The ISO suggests that the standards form the basis for legislation by providing 
the technical basis in areas, such as environmental legislation, health, and safety 
(ISO, n.d.b). Further, the U.S. government uses ISO standards in regulatory and 
procurement activities by drawing upon applicable standards and adopting them 
as a part of the regulatory scheme or including them in contracts to better their 
programs and improve outcomes. Additionally, ISO standards are included in the 
DoD Index of Specification and Standards (DoDISS) allowing for easy reference 
to the applicable standard when called for (National Institute of Standards & 
Technology, 1993). ISO standards facilitate trade by disseminating information 
on technological advances and good management practices and by producing 
uniform practices that when adopted, ensure wide acceptance across the 
marketplace. The ISO, by integrating private and public sectors, strives to ensure 
that a broad cross section of analysis is undertaken to produce standards that 
are fair, provide noticeable benefit, and can be met at an economical cost (ISO, 
n.d.b). This is done through the promotion of an international standard while 
increasing competition and providing larger markets for businesses to offer their 
products in. The ISO website offers the following: 
They [the ISO national delegations representing all economic 
stakeholders] agree on specifications and criteria to be applied 
consistently in the classification of materials, the manufacture of 
products and the provision of services. In this way, International 
Standards provide a reference framework, or a common 
technological language, between suppliers and their customers—
which facilitates trade and the transfer of technology. (ISO, n.d.c) 
As a result of broad acceptance, in many ways, the ISO standard has 
become the gold standard across the international market place. As 
demonstrated by ISO 9000, Quality Management Systems, the standards that 
the ISO system creates drive the market to compliance, even when not backed 
by regulation, through pressure brought to bear by the market place. Often 
companies that are not in compliance with the standard are looked at as deficient 
in some manner and others become hesitant to do business with them. Thus, as 
in other areas, the ISO is sure to be a driving force in the standards for energy 
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and energy efficiency that a company must meet when a standard is released. 
This same thought was the suggestion of many Navy acquisition executives at 
the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Energy Efficiency Summit. At the summit, 
numerous references were made to the fact that the ISO was working on 
developing standards in the area of energy and that they could become a base 
upon which the Navy could rely in the development of their own standards, or the 
ISO standard could be incorporated fully by reference. 
In fact, the ISO is expected to release ISO 50001, Management System 
for Energy (MSE) at the end of 2010 (Pinero, 2009, pp. 18–22). Standard 50001 
is based upon the same principles found in ISO 9000 series, Quality 
Management Systems, and ISO 14000 series, Environmental Management 
Systems, standards to ensure compatibility between the three. The working-draft 
scope statement for 50001 states: 
This standard specifies requirements for an energy management 
system, which enables an organization to take a systematic 
approach to the continual improvement of energy efficiency and 
energy performance. It does not itself state specific performance 
criteria with respect to energy. This standard applies to all 
organizations.” (Meffert & McKane, 2009)  
The scope statement indicates that the 50001 standard will require companies to 
implement a management system for energy that supports the organization in 
meeting its goals and vision for energy. The standard will not specify specific 
goals or requirements but will act in accordance with the same Plan-Do-Check-
Act model for continuous improvement used in ISO 9000 and 14000. The 













ISO 50001 will focus a company’s attention on the management of energy 
use, while allowing easy integration with the current 9000 and 14000 series 
standards for management systems. Designed from the beginning to employ 
many common elements and structures with the existing standards, it will allow 
for faster implementation by limiting the amount of training required to apply it. 
Edwin Pinero chair of the committee developing the ISO 50000 series standard 
explains the following. “International organizations will have access to a single 
harmonized standard for implementation across the organization, with a logical 
and consistent methodology for identifying and implementing energy efficiency 
improvements” (Pinero, 2009, p. 18). According to Pinero, the instruction will also 
meet the following objectives:  
• Assist organizations in making better use of their existing energy-
consuming assets 
• Offer guidance on benchmarking, measuring, documenting, and 
reporting energy intensity improvements and their projected impact 
on reductions in GHG emissions 
• Create transparency and facilitate communication on the 
management of energy resources 
• Promote energy management best practices and reinforce good 
energy management behaviors 
• Assist facilities in evaluating and prioritizing the implementation of 
new energy-efficient technologies 
• Provide a framework for promoting energy efficiency throughout the 
supply chain 
• Facilitate energy management improvements in the context of GHG 
emission reduction projects 
• Allow integration with other organization management systems 
(environment, health, and safety) (2009, p. 19) 
With the lofty objectives, as mentioned above, set for the ISO 50001 standard, 
when it is released, it is poised to provide an international framework designed to 
manage all aspects of energy from procurement to use. 
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2.  American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
Like the ISO, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is an NGO 
dedicated to standards in conformity assessment for the U.S. market. In fact, 
ANSI is the U.S. representative on the ISO’s board responsible for, ensuring the 
concerns of the public, academia, businesses, and the government agencies of 
the U.S. are heard in the establishment of international standards (ANSI, n.d). As 
listed on their website, the mission statement of ANSI is as follows: “to enhance 
both the global competitiveness of U.S. business and the U.S. quality of life by 
promoting and facilitating voluntary consensus standards and conformity 
assessment systems, and safeguarding their integrity” (ANSI, n.d). ANSI does 
not develop standards but coordinates their development and sanctions 
standard-developing organizations to do so. ANSI will approve those standards 
as long as they are developed following the procedures as outlined by ANSI. In 
2000, ANSI was one of the first national standards organizations to approve an 
energy management standard and along with the national standards organization 
for Brazil, is the project chair for the ISO in the development of ISO 50001 
(Energetics Incorporated, 2010). As such the energy standard that ANSI 
approved, ANSI Management System for Energy 2000:2008 (ANSI/MSE 
2000:2008), is expected to be similar in nature, if not the basis, of ISO 50001. 
The Georgia Tech Energy and Environmental Center (GTEEC) is the 
organization that developed the energy standard for ANSI. Figure 4 illustrates the 
Plan-Do-Check-Act process improvement employed in the ANSI/MSE standard, 




Figure 4.   Plan-Do-Check-Act Model (From: GTEEC, 2007b) 
 39
ANSI/MSE 2000:2008, like the expected ISO 50001, entails a voluntary 
program to help companies’ to reach the goals they set for energy use, 
management, and procurement. The ANSI/MSE standard recognizes both a 
technical and managerial aspect in driving and sustaining the energy goals of a 
company through a systematic process, which is flexible enough to be used 
across all organizations regardless of size, and fosters continual improvement in 
results (GTEEC, 2007a). As the GTEEC explains: “Implementation of the 
Management System for Energy (ANSI/MSE 2000:2008) contains the elements 
required to ensure continual improvement, sustain savings from energy projects 
and lead to a strategic energy management plan” (GTEEC, 2007a). The 
ANSI/MSE standard makes possible true energy management as a strategy by 
bringing to businesses a management focus and data combined with decision 
processes in order to produce results that will drive savings and provide market 
opportunities. 
3.  Wal-Mart 
Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, has adopted many policies and 
practices to deal with energy and energy efficiency as part of what it calls 
sustainability. According to Wal-Mart, sustainability is “minimizing waste, 
increasing efficiency and finding ways to support the communities and suppliers 
that make our business successful” (Wal-Mart, 2010). Wal-Mart places 
sustainability in both a social and environmental context and utilizes an approach 
it calls Sustainability 360 to address concerns in these areas in all facets of its 
business.  
Wal-Mart launched its sustainability programs in 2005 with three 





• Be supplied 100% by renewable energy; 
• Create zero waste; and 
• Sell products that sustain people and the environment. (Wal-Mart, 
2010) 
Under these overarching goals, Wal-Mart has 38 interim goals to drive their 
efforts towards achievement. In order to achieve these goals, Wal-Mart is looking 
beyond efforts that are completely internal to their company and is looking to 
affect the processes of its suppliers, vendors, and merchandisers as well—
something Wal-Mart’s size allows it to do. In their Global Sustainability Report, 
Wal-Mart explains the reason for their efforts as: 
Because the Wal-Mart supply system is many times larger than the 
company’s direct footprint, in many cases the biggest, fastest and 
most economical GHG (green house gas) reduction are not at the 
retail-level, but rather up or down the value-chain of consumer 
products, in raw material extraction, product manufacturing, 
transportation, customer use, or product end-of-life. (Wal-Mart, 
2010, Global Sustainability Report) 
Accordingly, Wal-Mart is focusing its sustainability goals to address its 
whole supply chain. As part of that focus, Wal-Mart is developing two programs 
specifically to address its suppliers: the Supplier Energy Efficiency Project 
(SEEP) and the Sustainability Index. SEEP is a program developed from Wal-
Mart’s own internal energy-efficiency program in which its engineers will go into 
an organization and perform an energy audit (Herrera, 2010). Wal-Mart offers the 
program outside of its suppliers as well, and at least 19 state governments are 
taking advantage of the program in their capitols (Wal-Mart, n.d.a). During the 
audit, the engineers identify areas for improvement that are designed to save 
electricity and money. Typically, the areas engineers identify are in lighting, 
HVAC, building envelope, and building controls (Herrera, 2010). 
The Sustainability Index is a much more complex effort, designed to bring 
transparency across the supply chain into the social and ecological aspects that 
bring a product to a stores shelves. For this effort, Wal-Mart is a founding 
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member of the Sustainability Consortium, which is lead by the University of 
Arkansas and Arizona State University (Arnseth, 2009). According to Wal-Mart’s 
Global Sustainability Report, the consortium is made up of an independent group 
of scientist and engineers from academic research institutions that are interacting 
with government scientist and other researchers from other retailers and the 
NGO community to develop and maintain a global database of information on 
product lifecycles from raw material to disposal (Wal-Mart, 2010). The data from 
the consortium will act as the basis for a consumer-facing index tool, designed to 
allow consumers to see a numerical rating of a product’s sustainability. The 
development of the index tool is occurring in three stages: 
1. Supplier Sustainability Assessment. As part of this step, Wal-Mart 
has already sent out a survey to 100,000 global suppliers. “The 
survey is not mandatory, but is designed to help suppliers evaluate 
their own sustainability efforts in four areas: energy and climate, 
natural resources, material efficiency, and people and community” 
(Arnseth, 2009). Figure 5 contains the questions that were asked in 
the survey. 
2. Lifecycle Analysis Database. This stage is being developed by the 
consortium and will track information on a product’s lifecycle to 
allow for an analysis on a products true environment, energy, and 
social impact. 
3. A Simple Tool for Customers. The final step of the index will be the 
translation of the information developed in step 2 to a tool or 
number by which the customer can understand the sustainability 
impact of the product that they are purchasing. The format of the 
tool is still in development (Wal-Mart, n.d.b). 
In explaining further how the index will be formed and what role the consortium 
will play, Dr. Kevin Dooley of Arizona State University, states in Inside Supply 
Management: 
There are two components to a sustainability index—the data, and 
then the algorithms used to calculate a final score. To be accepted, 
we believe that any index must use data that are scientifically valid 
and transparent in their sources and their level of uncertainty—and 
this is the role the consortium intends to play within any indexing 
scheme. […]The actual calculation of a final score or certification 
based on these data involves human judgment; thus, it is not a 
scientific task, but a business tasks. It is our hope that a broad 
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coalition of retailers and manufacturers will see the value in a 
unified effort to define how such scores are calculated and how 
they’re communicated to consumers, and we will work toward that 
goal. (as cited in Arnseth, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 5.   15 Questions for Suppliers (From: Walmart, 2009) 
Consequently, Wal-Mart is working through the Sustainability Index to 
drive energy efficiency across its suppliers not only from an internal sourcing 
perspective but also from the perspective of competition from the consumers who 
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shop at Wal-Mart. The publication of an index number, a tool, will provide the 
transparency necessary for merchants and consumers to make decisions based 
on information in conformance with the values that each holds. Wal-Mart intends 
that these actions taken together will drive efficiencies from suppliers in 
competition for business through product innovation. This innovation should then 
lead to greater efficiencies, creating greater value across the marketplace and for 
Wal-Mart (Herrera, 2010). All of which should then create the business case for 
Wal-Mart to continue with its sustainability programs. 
B. PUBLIC SECTOR 
1.  Laws, Executive Orders and Regulations 
The policy environment, as driven by Congress and the President, 
establishes the roadmap or direction in which agencies must pursue action. By 
defining public policy goals in laws and executive orders, Congress and the 
President set the destination for which agencies need to steer, through policies. 
The SECNAV’s announcement on energy and energy-efficiency requirements for 
the Navy is an example of an agency pursuing the course as intended by the 
President, with the exact directions yet to be laid out. What follows is a sampling 
of the road signs, in the form of laws, executive orders, and one memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) that have been laid out for federal agencies to follow with 
regard to energy policy: 
• Public Law 107—171: Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
(FSRIA) of 2002 
• Public Law 109—58: Energy Policy Act of 2005 
• Public Law 110—140: Energy Security and Independence Act 
(ESIA) of 2007 
• Public Law 111—5: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009 
• Public Law 110—417: FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act 
• Public Law 111—84: FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act: 
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• Executive Order 13423 Strengthening Federal Environmental, 
Energy, and Transportation Management, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919  
• Executive Order 13514 Federal Leadership in Environmental, 
Energy, and Economic Performance, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117  
• Federal Leadership in High Performance and Sustainable Buildings 
Memorandum of Understanding  
In addition to the sampling of laws above, the FAR lays out several areas in 
which energy needs to be considered with FAR Part 23—Environment, Energy, 
and Water Efficiency, Renewable Energy Technologies, Occupational Safety, 
and Drug Free Workforce—being the main thrust for conservation and 
efficiencies efforts in the FAR. The FAR also discusses energy as a part of the 
acquisition planning process in FAR Part 7 to ensure that all objectives of the 
acquisition are thought out in a balanced and complete manner. This approach 
has the best chance of consistently producing acquisition successes in meeting 
all program objectives and all sourcing requirements. 
In our examination of the policy environment that federal agencies are 
acting in, it has become clear to us that past and current authorities have called 
for agencies to pursue more efficient and cleaner energy use, what some call 
green procurement. Here, we will examine some of the actions that the different 
agencies are taking. We will organize non-DoD and DoD agencies together in 
order to look at the policies those groups have put in place to meet the 
requirements placed on them by Congress and the President. 
2.  Non-DoD Agencies 
While most of the non-DoD agencies of the federal government are 
unlikely to be affected by a metric for a fully burdened cost of fuel that is due to 
the location and manner in which they operate their equipment, they do have 
numerous responsibilities under the laws and executive orders in existence to 
increase the energy efficiency in which they operate and the energy efficiency of 
the equipment they buy. Numerous agencies have policy memorandums or 
letters laying out agency procedures for complying with laws, regulations, and 
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executive orders that are designed to drive energy-efficient practices and 
policies. However, the lead agencies for this effort tend to be the Department of 
Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have substantial 
obligations under the law to provide energy guidance and consulting for the 
federal government as a whole. In this chapter, we will look at the energy policies 
and practices of those two organizations. 
a. Department of Energy (DoE)  
The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) is a program 
run by the DoE. FEMP is designed to provide a host of services to support an 
effective energy program for all agencies of the federal government. “The 
Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) facilitates the Federal 
government's implementation of sound, cost-effective energy management and 
investment practices to enhance the nation's energy security and environmental 
stewardship” (DoE, 2009a). FEMP provides energy-efficiency consulting services 
to guide federal agencies in complying with the legislative and regulatory 
requirements placed on them; offers assistance in building and operating energy-
efficient buildings; produces and publishes product guidelines and specifications 
for energy consumption; provides assistance in identifying sources of renewable-
energy technology to meet an agency’s power needs; provides guidance on fleet 
management and implementation of alternative fueled vehicles; provides 
assistance in identifying and obtaining energy-project financing and contracting; 
and offers training in the implementation of a complete energy program from 
procurement to use (DoE, 2010). 
In short, the DoE’s effort in the energy area is to ensure that a total 
management focus is taken both internally and externally. This focus spans the 
three main areas of: (1) energy management at federal facilities, (2) energy 
management at the DoE, and (3) fleet and transportation management (DoE, 
2009a). 
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b. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
The EPA is the administrator of the Energy Star program, 
Comprehensive Procurement Guidelines (CPG), and Environmentally Preferred 
Purchasing (EPP) programs. Energy Star is a designation given to energy 
efficient products that meet the following criteria: 
• Product categories must contribute significant energy savings 
nationwide 
• Qualified products must deliver the features and performance 
demanded by consumers, in addition to increased energy efficiency 
• If the qualified product costs more than a conventional, less-
efficient counterpart, purchasers must recover their investment in 
increased energy efficiency through utility-bill savings, within a 
reasonable period of time (10 years) 
• Energy efficiency can be achieved through broadly available, non-
proprietary technologies offered by more than one manufacturer 
• Product energy consumption and performance must be measured 
and verified with testing 
• Labeling product packages must effectively differentiate products 
and be visible for purchasers (EPA, 2010b) 
The CPG program designates products that can be manufactured 
using recovered materials. Once a product is designated for the CPG, procuring 
agencies are required to purchase a product containing the highest content of 
recovered materials (EPA, 2009). FAR Part 23.4 places the requirement of 
procuring recovered materials designated by the CPG on federal agencies. 
Lastly, the EPP provides green product and services information to ensure 
compliance with green purchasing requirements. The EPP compiles information 
to allow for the easy comparison of a product’s green specifications while 
allowing for a cost-benefit analysis to take place with regard to the purchasing 
decision (EPA, 2010a).  
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3.  DoD 
Due to numerous reports detailing the fact that the services in the DoD 
undervalue the fully burdened cost of fuel as an element of the lifecycle energy 
cost and to the increasingly loud voice of operational commanders who are 
calling for weapons systems and technology that relieve the logistics burden of 
fueling those systems, the DoD has been pushed to take a lead in the drive for 
energy efficiency. As a result of the operational environment and the types of 
systems that the DoD employs, the DoD’s drive toward energy efficiency has 
gone beyond the efforts that non-DoD agencies and organizations are 
employing, particularly in respect to the valuation issue of the fully burdened cost 
of fuel. The fully burdened cost of delivered energy was implemented as a 
mandatory element in trade-off analyses conducted for all tactical systems that 
consume energy in an April 10, 2007, memorandum from the Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L). Today, guidance requiring the fully burdened cost of fuel is 
contained in the DoD 5000 series framework. We will now look at the actions that 
the Army and Air Force are employing with regard to the energy issue.  
a. Army  
In 2004, the Army issued The Army Strategy for the Environment: 
Sustain the Mission—Secure the Future, which established a long-range vision 
for the Army of sustainability. The strategy, as laid out in the document, 
“transitions the Army’s compliance-based environmental program to mission-
oriented approach based on the principles of sustainability” (U.S. Army, 2004). 
The document defines sustainability from the Army perspective as being able to 
“meet current, as well as future mission requirements worldwide, safeguards 
human health, improves quality of life, and enhances the natural environment” 
(U.S. Army, 2004). As part of the strategy vision, the document lays out six goals, 
including one for minimizing impact and total ownership cost, which directs the 
Army’s posture toward the environment. 
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As a result of a new mission-based focus for the Army’s 
environmental program, on January 7, 2009, a memo was released with the 
subject, Energy Productivity in U.S. Army Weapon Systems. This memo called 
for Army acquisition managers to consider energy-supply assurance, energy-
demand reduction, and energy efficiency in their decision-making. One of the 
items in the memo called for program managers (PMs) to “ensure that the FBCF 
methodology is used in the estimation of the Ownership Cost Key Systems 
Attribute” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (AT&L), 2009). It also 
required PMs to “include energy productivity in source selection criteria, 
statements of work or performance descriptions for design and development, and 
procurement contracts for end items and major sub-systems” (2009). Included as 
an attachment to that memo was guidance on implementing the fully burdened 
cost of fuel in accordance with the Army-approved seven-step process. The 
Army’s seven-step process is discussed further in Chapter IV.  
On January 13, 2009, the Army updated its strategy with the 
release of Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy. This strategy called 
for five overarching goals for the Army with regard to energy: surety, survivability, 
supply, sufficiency, and sustainability (U.S. Army, 2009). The new strategy 
adopted the ISO 14000 series standard in order to manage its program for 
sustainability and established an Army-energy leadership framework centered 
around the newly created Army Senior Energy Council (SEC) (U.S. Army, 2009).  
b. Air Force  
The Air Force is the largest end-user of energy in the DoD and in 
the federal government (U.S. Air Force, 2010). For many years, the Air Force’s 
primary focus in the area of energy was in the development of bio-fuels, 
particularly for their aircraft. The focus of the Air Force was on the diversity of its 
supply in order to ensure effective access. In 2010, the Air Force issued a new 
plan and vision for energy: “The Vision for the Air Force Energy Plan—Make 
Energy a Consideration in All We Do—highlights that energy is central to all of 
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the interdependent functional aspects of the Air Force’s mission execution” (U.S. 
Air Force, 2010). This new plan recognizes the central role that energy serves in 
enabling the Air Force to fulfill its mission, and it recognizes the constant 
assessment that is needed to ensure that objectives are being met and are still 
valid. As the Air Force Energy Plan 2010 explains: “Energy Management is an 
evolving process that will require the systematic incorporation of new information, 
rigorous insertion of technological advancements, and continuous improvement 
of process and practices” (U.S. Air Force, 2010). The Air Force identified three 
pillars that will guide the management of energy: reduce demand, increase 
supply, and change the culture. In order to ensure the integration of the three 
pillars, the Air Force established the Energy Senior Focus Group (SFG) as a 
management structure for its energy programs (U.S. Air Force, 2010). 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY/ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we looked at selected private- and public-sector practices 
with regard to energy and energy efficiencies. While industry is progressing on 
energy efficiencies, little effort is being made with regard to identifying metrics to 
calculate a fully burdened cost of fuel, mainly due to the uniqueness of the 
requirement and its almost exclusive applicability to DoD functions. In terms of 
the public sector, non-DoD agencies are taking advantage of similar industry 
practices in the areas of energy efficiencies, but again, the fully burdened fuel 
metric remains a DoD problem. The DoD and the services are also taking 
advantage of the industry experience and adopting industry practices for the 
management of energy; however, the services and the DoD seem to be working 
through issues with identifying the elements that constitute the fully burdened 
cost of fuel and with defining what standard produces the most beneficial results 
for decision-making.  
In the relatively new area of energy management, standards are being 
developed and existing standards are being improved through the application of 
new technologies and metrics that measure and record benchmarks as part of a 
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management system for energy. The current ANSI Management System for 
Energy and the future ISO 50000 series standard entail the extensive use of a 
continuous feedback loop to allow constant assessment and correction of an 
organizations energy strategy to meet new and ever-changing goals for 
improvement. 
These management systems for energy are becoming more widespread 
because of the demonstrated successes that they have already enjoyed—
successes, such as the Wal-Mart sustainability effort. These management 
systems are successful because they are able to focus on energy-efficiency 
opportunities and take advantage of those opportunities to create value for the 
companies employing them. In other words, they are successful because they 
are able to demonstrate a return on investment or a business case for the 
companies employing them. 
The DoD and the military services have taken notice of the effectiveness 
of having a management system for energy in place by adopting in some manner 
the model within each of their organizations. The same value that these 
management systems can create for the private sector is available to the public 
sector in the form of savings on energy costs. Additionally, the management 
systems that the DoD and the services are employing are allowing for a 
concerted assessment and planning of strategies to meet their targets in energy 
and energy-related criteria. In other words, the management systems for energy 
that the DoD and the services are employing are allowing them to move beyond 
simple compliance with existing laws and regulations and to drive toward 
specified energy and efficiency goals.  
With regard to the SECNAV’s announcement, management systems for 
energy shows great promise in being able to meet the SECNAV’s goal to drive 
industry to produce the Navy’s systems in a more energy-efficient manner. By 
encouraging a contractor or prospective contractor to adopt a system for 
managing energy, the system forces the contractor to take a proactive approach 
in the area. By taking a proactive approach to managing energy, a contractor will 
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likely turn up inefficiencies—many of which can be easily reduced or eliminated, 
thus increasing contractor profit and producing Navy systems in a more efficient 
manner. Additionally, encouraging a contractor to adopt a management system 
for energy, as called for in the ANSI and ISO standards, has the added bonus of 
removing the Navy from the cost associated with developing a unique standard 
and from many of the costs associated with compliance with a new standard, 
while also maintaining the objectiveness that comes with the widespread 
adoption of industry standards in the commercial marketplace.  
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V. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In review of acquisition policy, we identify opportunities and weaknesses 
in the current policy. The problem definition will be enhanced by establishing a 
basis of comparison between existing acquisition policy and new amendments to 
that policy. The addition of enhanced energy evaluation factors will present some 
similarities, differences, and challenges brought on by new policy directed by the 
SECNAV. In his address to the Naval Energy Forum in October 2009, the 
SECNAV introduced lifecycle energy cost as a mandatory evaluation factor in the 
acquisition process. This includes the fully burdened cost of fuel, as well as the 
overall energy efficiency and energy footprint of competing contractors and holds 
them contractually accountable (Mabus, 2009). We will analyze the energy-
related concepts and definitions contained in existing policy for compatibility with 
the goals and objectives the SECNAV aims to achieve. We will use these 
comparisons to identify potential challenges that acquisition agencies will need to 
address in future procurements. We will begin the current policy identification 
with definitions of the acquisition evaluation factors related to lifetime energy 
cost. 
A.  TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
We are going to change the way the Navy and Marine Corps 
awards contracts. The lifetime energy cost of a building or a 
system, and the fully burdened cost of fuel in powering those, will 
be a mandatory evaluation factor used when awarding contracts. 
We are going to hold industry contractually accountable for meeting 
energy targets and system efficiency requirements. 




The term total ownership cost (TOC) is a concept used in program 
acquisition analysis to evaluate the magnitude and scope of costs associated 
with a program. The relevance of TOC with respect to the SECNAV’s goals and 
policy is its inclusion of lifecycle costs. Lifecycle costs include many direct and 
indirect cost elements, elements in which energy and fuel are included.  
The concept of TOC is broadly defined by the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (DAG) as the inclusion of lifecycle cost elements, as well as other 
indirect costs associated with infrastructure or business process costs not 
normally attributed to the program. It reaches beyond the direct and indirect costs 
associated with lifecycle costs to include broader support and infrastructure 
activities, such as recruiting, accession training, and contract oversight by the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). The concept of TOC is used to 
consolidate direct and indirect costs that are attributed to a program and its 
operation (DAU, 2010). This concept is fundamental to understanding how 
lifecycle energy costs contribute to TOC. It should also be noted that the largest 
components of TOC are personnel, operations, and maintenance, which can 
account for 70–80% of the total lifecycle cost of a program (Fein, 2010). 
The concept of TOC is not defined or described in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) or the Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(NMCARS). However, lifecycle cost is used in the FAR and DFARS and is 
closely related to TOC, yet there is no use of lifecycle cost in the NMCARS. The 
difference between TOC and lifecycle cost is breadth of scope. The scope of life-
cycle cost is not as broad as the scope used in TOC. 
Life-cycle cost includes all costs that are logically attributed to a program. 
It includes all direct and indirect costs and is summarized into four categories: 
research and development, investment, operating and support, and disposal. The 
majority of energy and fuel costs fall into the operating and support category. 
Figure 6 shows how significantly that operating and support costs impact the total 
lifecycle cost of a program (DAU, 2010). This figure can also be used to illustrate 
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the initial acquisition cost, which is comprised of research, and development, as 
well as the investment cost. Since the majority of costs are assumed in the 
operations and support phase rather than the initial phases of acquisition, it 
would seem logical to evaluate a system based on the expectation and inclusion 
of operations and support costs rather than just on the initial acquisition costs, 
which is where program managers tend to focus. Thus, this distribution of a 




Figure 6.   Notional Profile of Annual Program Expenditures by Cost Category 
over the System Lifecycle 
In a 2008 article on the Air Force’s competition for a new tanker aircraft, 
John Young, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics claimed that lifecycle costs are too difficult to accurately assess 
because of fluctuations in areas outside the Pentagon’s control. An example he 
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gave was the recent price fluctuation of oil, which had dropped significantly and 
reduced the lifecycle costs of competing tanker aircraft. The fuel efficiencies of 
the two aircraft were different and given the challenge of predicting costs in the 
future, the easiest way to conduct a price competition was through the initial 
acquisition cost of developing and purchasing the first model (Butler, 2008). This 
is an approach that other programs across the services take. This approach is an 
example that counters the concept and application of using lifecycle costs and 
TOC. An approach, such as this ignores many of the costs (i.e., operations and 
maintenance) incurred beyond the acquisition of the first item, which would be 
included in the composition of lifecycle cost. 
Part of the problem in systems acquisition, such as the Air Force’s 
approach on lifecycle costs for its new tanker aircraft, is the lack of policy to 
sufficiently guide acquisition professionals in the use of lifecycle cost. The lack of 
policy is analogous to the SECNAV’s goals and policy on lifecycle energy costs. 
For instance, one drawback with respect to the SECNAV’s goals and policy is 
that the FAR, DFARS, NMCARS, and DAG do not give a specific definition for 
lifecycle energy cost. Energy and its encompassing components, such as fuel 
and electricity are grouped as cost elements under the operations and support 
category. However, it is unclear if those costs are at the commodity prices or the 
fully burdened price. The DAG provides a separate explanation for when the fully 
burdened cost of delivered energy should be applied in the acquisition cycle, but 
there is no correlation or guidance that clearly relates the fully burdened cost of 
delivered energy to lifecycle cost, lifecycle energy cost, or to whether it should be 
accounted for in the operations and support category of total lifecycle costs 
(DAU, 2010).  
A connection between lifecycle energy costs and the fully burdened cost 
of delivered energy is apparent, but not clearly defined or associated. A parallel 
may also be drawn between lifecycle costs and lifecycle energy costs. If the 
same estimation and analysis that is applied to life cycle cost is applied to life 
cycle energy cost, then the concept of lifecycle energy cost may be interpolated. 
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Otherwise, the term and concept is undefined and, therefore, needs clarification 
to meet the SECNAV’s energy evaluation requirements. Additionally, if lifecycle 
energy cost falls under the presumed connection with lifecycle cost, then they will 
have a direct impact on TOC. 
The DAG also provides four different methods and/or models to estimate 
costs for a weapons system (DAU, 2010). The method or model is chosen based 
on the suitability of available data and on the maturity of the program. Most 
estimates are derived from a combination of the following estimation techniques: 
• Parametric. This method uses regression or statistical analysis to 
develop cost-estimating relationships. A cost-estimating 
relationship of the desired cost element is derived from one or more 
independent variables. 
• Analogy. This method uses historical data to estimate costs for an 
analogous system. A currently fielded system is used to draw 
similar costs to the desired cost element of the system under 
consideration. 
• Engineering Estimate. The use of engineering estimates requires 
extensive knowledge of a system and its characteristics coupled 
with ample amounts of detailed data. The components of a system 
are broken down into individual elements and costs are determined 
separately. They are then aggregated to form a total cost. 
• Actual Costs. This method uses actual costs experienced or trends 
from similar systems. Cost estimates that support a full-rate 
production milestone decision should be based on actual cost data 
to the greatest extent possible. 
These models/methods can also be used to understand the costs 
associated with lifecycle energy costs. However, with any model or method, the 
results are reflective of the inputs. One of the challenges with estimating lifecycle 
energy costs is deciding which factors to incorporate into the estimation for a 
system that may last decades into the future. The volatility of fuel prices is one 
example. If competing systems operate on the same fuel, then the market 
volatility will affect them both equally and therefore make the market volatility 
negligible. However, in evaluating the lifecycle energy costs of different sources 
of fuel for competing systems, the market volatility of one fuel may not be 
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reflective of the other because the market could affect them differently (e.g., 
gasoline compared to biofuel). Plus, there are no certain indicators of what each 
type of fuel will experience over the lifecycle of a system. Thus, a lifecycle 
analysis on competing fuel sources is difficult to ascertain and to attribute the 
proper amount of fairness as an evaluation factor. 
The Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, DoD Instruction 
5000.02, does not provide a definition for lifecycle energy costs. It does state that 
during the analysis of alternatives in the Material Solution Analysis phase, 
energy-efficient solutions consistent with cost effectiveness and mission 
requirements should be assessed. It also states that the fully burdened cost of 
delivered energy should be used in trade-off analyses for all DoD tactical 
systems with end-items that create a demand for energy (USD(AT&L), 2008, p. 
59). 
In order to deliver actionable items that meet the SECNAV’s goals, the 
definition of lifecycle energy costs should be listed in the policy and guidance 
used by Navy acquisition agencies and professionals. The Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics Management is in the process 
of drafting guidance that accomplishes this objective. This guidance will more 
clearly delineate the terms and procedures to correspond with the SECNAV’s 
energy goals and policy. This new policy should, therefore, be made available for 
public comment and the input of industry. The vetted product should then be 
reflected as a change to the NMCARS so that it may be binding to industry when 
competing for business with the Navy and Marine Corps. 
1. Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) 
The term “fully burdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) merits discussion because it 
is a component of TOC and because of its recent popularity in understanding fuel 
costs on the battlefield. As an example, in the SECNAV’s October address to the 
Navy Energy Forum he quoted USMC Commandant General Conway as stating 
that there are places on the battlefield where it costs up to $400 per gallon to 
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deliver fuel (Mabus, 2009). These costs have brought awareness to Congress 
and senior leadership within the military about the way tactical operations are 
conducted and supported. 
Historically, the evaluation process in defense acquisition has typically 
considered the commodity price as the only lifecycle cost of fuel determinant. 
Using only the commodity price of fuel disregards the necessary costs of 
transporting, storing, and protection to the point of use. The supporting 
infrastructure and manpower assets necessary to provide fuel are cost 
contributors that should also be evaluated and included in the analysis of costs 
(Corley, 2009). 
For the purposes of continuity in terms, Defense Department guidance 
refers to FBCF as the Fully Burdened Cost of Delivered Energy (FBCE). The 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, DoD Instruction 5000.02, states 
very succinctly that the FBCE should be used in trade-off analyses for all DoD 
tactical systems with end-items that create a demand for energy (USD(AT&L), 
2008, p. 59). 
The DAG furthers the explanation of this concept. The DAG states that the 
inefficient use of fuel or energy in tactical systems has vulnerabilities that are 
often unrecognized. Those vulnerabilities include a greater demand of energy 
and, therefore, greater dependence on logistics forces. Furthermore, 
inefficiencies in fuel consumption impose limitations on operational flexibility by 
demanding greater support and replenishment. The limits of the support and 
replenishment capabilities and systems providing them will further limit the 
operational flexibility. The DAG also states that one reason for not recognizing 
the vulnerability of energy demands is the acquisition process undervalues the 
benefits of technologies that can reduce energy demands in deployed systems. 
Thus, the FBCE was created to give more importance to energy use on the 
battlefield so that it might be applied to trade-off analyses in the acquisition 
process. Accordingly, this should be included in the Analysis of Alternatives 
conducted during the Material Solution Analysis phase of the Defense Acquisition 
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Lifecycle Management System. The FBCE should also be added to the total 
ownership cost (TOC) estimates used in system design and technology trades 
(DAU, 2010). 
The National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2009 defines the fully 
burdened cost of fuel as “the commodity price for fuel plus the costs of all assets 
and personnel required to transport and, when necessary, provide security from 
the receiving point to the point at which it will be consumed” (U.S. House, 2008). 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also acknowledges the 
potential benefits to improving warfighting effectiveness that may result from 
pursuing greater energy efficiency and corresponding technologies. It does so by 
including a section that reinforces the National Defense Authorization Act of 
2009. The report also further contributes to the pursuit of these goals by 
designating a fund that is used for innovation toward improving operational 
energy concepts. The QDR states, 
Energy efficiency can serve as a force multiplier, because it 
increases the range and endurance of forces in the field and can 
reduce the number of combat forces diverted to protect energy 
supply lines, which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and 
conventional attacks and disruptions. DoD must incorporate 
geostrategic and operational energy considerations into force 
planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes. To 
address these challenges, DoD will fully implement the statutory 
requirement for the energy efficiency Key Performance Parameter 
and fully burdened cost of fuel set forth in the 2009 National 
Defense Authorization Act. The Department will also investigate 
alternative concepts for improving operational energy use, including 
the creation of an innovation fund administered by the new Director 
of Operational Energy to enable components to compete for 
funding on projects that advance integrated energy solutions. (DoD, 
2010, p. 87) 
One of the potential problems in the transition to alternative fuel sources is 
not moving from one type of fuel to another more efficient type. The problem 
exists in creating another needed fuel to operate in a combat area and, thus, 
having multiple fuel sources required to operate equipment in a transformation 
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phase for alternative energy. While some new systems require less fuel and 
others may be created that operate on alternative fuel, the infrastructure and 
footprint needed may actually increase. So, instead of transporting and storing 
diesel fuel, gasoline, and aviation fuel, alternative fuel may now add to the array 
of fuels needed to optimally operate systems in combat. Creating a larger fuel 
footprint in order to store and manage more fuels increases the vulnerability for 
commanders by increasing the diversity and the corresponding size of the 
logistics tail. So, part of the solution is not to add new types of fuel to operational 
environments, but to fully replace conventional fuels in combat areas with more 
energy-efficient fuels that induce a smaller logistics tail. In accordance with FAR 
Par 7 (2009), this analysis should be applied to the acquisition planning stage of 
system procurement. Reviewing these potential impacts in the acquisition 
planning phase will help determine if the required system will meet the 
warfighter’s effectiveness while achieving the desired energy related goals and 
reductions in vulnerability. 
These policies clearly recognize the apparent significance and importance 
that FBCF/FBCE can play in the acquisition of systems but fail to provide clarity 
on a uniform composition of elements that should comprise FBCF/FBCE. The 
poorly defined elements necessary to capture the essence of the concept leave 
room for interpretation. In conjunction, the data necessary to capture the essence 
of the concept is nebulous too. 
A supplement to the DAG, titled Fully Burdened Cost of Delivered Energy-
- Methodological Guidance for Analyses of Alternatives and Acquisition 
Tradespace Analysis, provides an interim solution to the clarity of FBCF/FBCE 
elements. This guidance provides an interim guideline for calculating FBCF while 
a fully developed determination is in progress. The interim guidance outlines a 7-
step method to estimate FBCF. The planning steps in this model are a method 
that is dependent on a given scenario. While it is broad guidance for determining 
burdened costs, the steps should be tailored for selected supply chains, systems, 
or platforms within a given scenario (DAU, 2010). 
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Note: DESC is Defense Energy Support Center 
 
Figure 7.   OUSD (AT&L)–Defined Cost Elements for FBCF 
In a thesis by Robert Corley (2009), the 7–step method was tested with an 
application of cost data associated with a DDG-51 class surface combatant. His 
results add more validity to the 7–step method and support its utility in cost 
analysis. The results of his analysis provide three key observations: 
1. Even with the expected fluctuations of commodity fuel prices in the 
future, burdens associated with infrastructure, manpower, force 
protection and security will still have a significant proportion of the 
total cost burdens. 
2. The fully burdened cost to purchase, transport, store and protect 
fuel and its logistics tail can be many times greater than the 
commodity price of fuel alone. 
3. With a conservative value assigned to cost element 7 in the model, 
the resulting increase in fuel cost per gallon was not 
inconsequential. In fact, when multiplied over the lifecycle of the 
platform it amounted to several billions of dollars (Corley, 2009). 
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Corley’s analysis validates the utility of assessing FBCF and using it early 
in the acquisition process. Used correctly, this analysis can potentially conserve 
defense funding or channel the funding more effectively into other resources 
required to operate in the nation’s interest. 
B.  ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND FOOTPRINTS OF COMPETING 
COMPANIES 
We will also use the overall energy efficiency and the energy 
footprint of a competing company as an additional factor in 
acquisition decisions. 
-Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus 
The SECNAV’s announcement about evaluating energy efficiency and the 
energy footprint of competing companies is a way to influence companies that do 
business with the Navy to conform to the Navy’s values on energy efficiency. It 
could potentially steer companies toward a more conscious awareness of their 
impact on the environment and the sources of energy they use. Prior to the 
SECNAV’s announcement, contractors were not evaluated on the energy 
efficiency of their facilities. If a contractor wanted to be more energy efficient, 
then the company could invest capital to do so. A decision to do so could 
possibly result in improved profit margins or in enabling the contractor to place 
more competitive bids on contracts. However, this announcement marks a 
turning point in which the energy efficiency and energy footprint will be required 
as mandatory evaluation factors in the source selection of an item. Therefore, the 
SECNAV’s announcement provokes a greater incentive to make investments in 
energy-efficient improvements. 
Deciding among competitors could become difficult when comparing more 
than one contractor that has energy efficient measures in place. Some method of 
evaluating the difference in energy efficiency between competitors will need to be 
developed for use in the acquisition decision process. Then again, how much 
weight should be given in an acquisition decision for contractor facilities when the 
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ultimate objective is to acquire a system or platform that meets a defined 
requirement? In order to give these energy characteristics a viable influence in 
acquisition decisions some amount of relative weighting and/or an associated 
value assigned to the outcome will need to be developed and translated into an 
assessment criteria. This is one of the challenges with incorporating the energy 
efficiency and energy footprint of a company as a mandatory evaluation factor. 
Having little guidance or leadership to account for the value and resulting weight 
in an acquisition decisions especially with respect to other evaluation factors will 
make decisions based on companies’ energy profile difficult. Furthermore, 
without having a value assigned to a company’s energy efficiency, it is possible 
this evaluation factor will get downplayed by criteria that are more directly tied to 
the actual requirement. 
An established standard by which to compare different contractors will 
provide fairness and consistency in evaluation. Currently, the U.S. Green 
Building Council uses a Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
Green Building Rating System to assess buildings. This assessment promotes a 
whole-building approach to sustainability. It accomplishes this by recognizing 
performance in five key areas of human and environmental health: sustainable 
site development, water savings, energy efficiency, materials selection and 
indoor environmental quality (USGBC, 2010). A second standard that is being 
developed is the ISO 50000 series certification mentioned in Chapter IV. This 
could be an additional way to use a developed criteria based on a uniform set of 
standards. These standards could then be utilized as an objective means of 
achieving a standard criterion for evaluation among competing companies. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The SECNAV’s announcement on energy and energy-related criteria 
places the Navy in the position of not merely being in compliance with existing 
laws and regulations but of truly driving goals and expectations in new ways in 
order to position the energy question as a strategic issue. The two main policy 
drivers pushing the energy issue to the forefront are as follows:  
• A warfighter’s requirement—The increasingly complex weapons 
systems the Navy is procuring, developing, and using require more 
and more energy to operate and, thus, more logistics support. This 
logistics support reduces combat power by requiring combat assets 
for security and increases vulnerability due to increased convoys 
and greater risk from an enemy that would seek to deny access.  
• Budgetary need—Increasing pressure is being placed on the DoD 
budget and, thus, on the Navy’s as well. With the Navy currently not 
able to meet the stated requirement of 313 ships due to funding 
constraints, pressure is increasing to find areas for savings in order 
to allow the Navy to maintain the fleet it has and to build the fleet it 
needs (Rutherford, 2010). In looking at the cost structure of a 
weapon system, the majority of its cost occurs during the 
operations and support phase of a weapons system’s life, and yet 
the area in which cost is substantially locked-in is in the 
development phase at the Critical Design Review (CDR). Thus, any 
effort to drive savings in a weapon system needs to occur or 
concentrate on the acquisition phase. The budgetary point is driven 
home by the following news article headlines: U.S. House 
Seapower Chair Wants Ship-Retirement Limits: Gates: U.S. Must 
Rethink Expensive Warships, Carriers, EFV: and Gates Seeks 
Pentagon Overhaul: Wants to Cut Costs of Weapons, Health Care, 
Administration.  
In applying the SECNAV’s energy criteria to acquisitions, the Navy has an 
opportunity to ensure that energy both as an operational requirement and 
financial cost driver is properly valued in making key decisions regarding 
acquisition programs and development. However, of primary importance when 
applying the SECNAV’s energy criteria is fulfilling the warfighters’ requirements, 
delivering a system that meets the needs as stated in the requirements 
document remains the primary goal for acquisition decisions to meet. Navy 
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acquisition officials operating with an understanding that energy efficiency can 
serve as a combat multiplier and an investment to future savings, can lead to 
distinctions between bids, and, with the proper weight given to energy criteria, 
can lead the Navy to make the best acquisition decisions for its programs.  
In light of the SECNAV’s direction on energy and energy-related criteria 
and in light of the need for the Navy to produce criteria that are objective, provide 
meaningful analysis, withstand legal challenges, offer meaningful performance 
advantages, produce cost savings, and fulfill warfighter’s requirements, our 
findings are presented below. 
A. FINDINGS 
In light of our research, we offer the following as our findings: 
1. In accordance with previous reports and studies, the Navy 
undervalues energy both as an operational factor and as a long-
term cost driver or multiplier. 
2. Navy makes acquisition decisions based upon first article price 
rather than total ownership cost. 
3. Beyond the advantages to a company of having a process or 
system in which to manage energy, there exists little agreement on 
what constitutes differing categories of energy performance. 
4. Little agreement exists on the metrics and means necessary to 
evaluate competing companies with regard to the energy footprint 
they produce. A larger company may have a larger footprint and yet 
be more efficient then a smaller company. In the same manner, 
companies in differing regions will make investment decisions 
based upon the climate where their facilities are and yet those 
investment decisions may not align with the energy efficiencies of 
the companies. In other words, a company in Boston making 
extensive investments to deal with harsh winters, could, in spite of 
those investments, be disadvantaged versus a company in San 
Diego due strictly to the increased energy needed to maintain 
climate control in their facilities. 
5. In light of the difficulty with establishing consensus for metrics and 
means to evaluate the energy footprint of companies (i.e., 
developing a Navy-wide yardstick), it is preferable to require 
contractors demonstrate an energy management process. 
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6. Warfighters are starting to recognize the importance of energy 
efficiency to the systems they employ on the battlefield and the 
consequences for having inefficient systems to the combat power 
they can employ. 
7. Energy criteria need to be stressed by requirements generators in 
order to create the demand for evaluation of the criteria at the 
contract award phase.  
8. Many of the current weapons system programs are locked into 
contracts, and it would be cost prohibitive to re-open those 
programs while under current contract. 
9. The importance of the FBCE or FBCF is recognized, yet 
disagreement persists as to how far out the elements that produce 
those numbers go.  
10. International standards with regard to energy management are 
being produced and employed. Leading companies, such as Wal-
Mart are among those highlighting best practices in attempting to 
drive energy efficiencies and generate savings. 
11. Disagreement persists in how long out the Navy should be looking 
to generate a positive net present value when making energy 
decisions. Current executive-order guidance calls for federal 
agencies to make energy investments with a return on investment 
in 10 years. 
12. A significant portion of total ownership cost is set by the final design 
of the system, which is determined at CDR, and, thus, serious effort 
to produce savings needs to look at the elements prior to reaching 
this point. 
13. The current acquisition process contains disincentives for programs 
and PMs to address anything more than the initial acquisition cost 
to their programs.  
B RECOMMENDATIONS 
After concluding our research, we recommend the following actions: 
1. In governing new Navy requirements, contractors put in place an 
energy management process rather than submit to an arbitrary 
energy footprint or efficiency standard. 
2. Draft an amendment to the Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition 
Regulations governing the new energy requirements. Justifications 
and recommended proposal are included below in section C.  
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3. Requirements generators and acquisition personnel should be 
brought together to drive home and vet energy perspectives from 
both points of view and to create a balanced policy for 
implementation. 
4. Within each program office, a senior position should be created for 
an advocate of sustainability and logistics over a systems lifecycle. 
5. An extensive education campaign needs to take place with regard 
to leadership (presidential, congressional, DoD) to educate on the 
difference between initial acquisition cost and total ownership cost 
and on the importance of total ownership cost to maintaining the 
fleet.  
6. Total ownership cost needs to play a greater role in acquisition 
decisions to generate savings over the life of a system. 
7. Acquisition decisions need to be made with a long-term 
perspective. Total ownership cost needs to be evaluated using a 
net present value system in all system acquisitions. In order to 
evaluate whether an initial investment in the energy efficiency of a 
weapons system brings the proper return on that investment, total 
ownership cost needs to be defined by a dollar value. These return 
–on-investment decisions need to be made with an eye toward 
generating future savings in order to ensure the affordability of the 
fleet. 
8. In judging a company’s energy efficiency and footprint, given the 
lack of objective criteria, a company should be required to conform 
to an energy management system standard, such as the 
ANSI/MSE 2000:2008, which is soon to be replaced by the ISO 
50000 series. By adopting standards that maintain broad private- 
and public-sector support, the Navy can avoid the cost of 
developing the standard and much of the cost of the 
implementation. 
9. Extensive training on the new energy requirements take place in 
the acquisition community. 
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR NAVY MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION 
REGULATIONS 
Currently, the Navy is drafting a policy memo to implement the energy and 
energy efficiency requirements directed by the SECNAV. However, due to the 
nature of a policy memo being internal guidance our recommendation is to 
produce a proposal for inclusion in the Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition 
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Regulation Supplement (NMCARS), which would govern those seeking to do 
business with the Navy, as well as the internal structures and processes of the 
Navy. Additionally, in taking this recommendation, we propose the Navy highlight 
the impending energy rules through two steps: 
1. The issuance of an advanced notice of public rulemaking. This step 
would ensure that a period of public comment and rule making be 
established during which the valuable input of industry, and others 
could be taken into consideration to drive better policy 
development. 
2.  The formation of a negotiated rulemaking committee. This step 
would ensure that, in the formulation of the new energy criteria, that 
industries concerns were addressed and incorporated into the new 
regulation. Additionally, it would help to ensure buy-in from industry 
in general by giving them a seat at the table in tailoring the new 
energy criteria. Also, by allowing industry participation in this 
process, it would ensure that any criteria did not impose an undue 
additional cost burden on the Navy.    
Our guidance for development of this proposal is in line with our 
recommendations above but of primary importance was the desire to contain 
cost while meeting the SECNAV’s directives for energy. Additionally, in 
considering any implementation regarding energy and energy related criteria the 
primary purpose and objective of Navy acquisitions is to meet the warfighter’s 
requirements while maintaining the FAR’s policy of transparency, and full and 
open competition. With this in mind, the following is our recommended 
amendment to the NMCARS. 
PART 5215 CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION 
5215.304 EVALUATION FACTORS AND SIGNIFICANT SUBFACTORS 
(c)(7)(i) Except as set forth in paragraph (c)(7)(ii) of this section, energy 
management shall be evaluated in all source selections for negotiated 
competitive acquisitions expected to meet requirements to be designated 
an acquisition category program (ACAT) and subject to the requirements 
of DoD 5000.02 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. 
(ii) Energy management need not be evaluated if the contracting officer 
documents the reason energy management is not an appropriate 
evaluation factor for the acquisition or in cases designated as a rapid 
deployment capability. 
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5215.305 Proposal evaluation 
(a)(6)Energy management evaluation. The energy management criteria is 
an evaluation of offeror’s ability to deliver energy efficient products in an 
energy efficient manner. This comparative assessment evaluates an 
offeror’s proposed weapon system or platform in terms of its total 
ownership cost, and the system the company has in place to manage its 
energy efficiency in delivering proposed weapon system or platform. For 
contracts for buildings see (iii) below. 
(i) Total ownership cost shall include lifecycle energy cost including the 
fully burdened cost of fuel. In submitting estimates for the fully burdened 
cost of fuel (FBCF) offerors shall provide documentation of their 
calculation in accordance with the approved Seven-Step OSD PA&E 
Methodology. In submitting documentation of lifecycle energy cost the 
offeror shall rely upon the standards of the OSD Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE) and DoD Cost Analysis Guidance and 
Procedures. The justification for this analysis is that energy efficiency in a 
weapon system or platform will drive total ownership cost down, thus the 
most efficient weapons system or platform would also have the lowest 
total ownership cost. 
(ii) In evaluating the energy efficiency of the offerors an assessment will 
be made as to an adequate management system for energy being in place 
and utilized. Offerors and respondents shall show evidence of their 
management system for energy as proscribed in the applicable acquisition 
document. An adequate management system for energy will be a system 
that meets the standards of ANSI/MSE 2000:2008, the future ISO 50001 
standard or an equivalent. 
(iii) In evaluating an offeror’s proposal for a building sufficient information 
shall be provided to ensure that procurements comply with DoD policy to 
build, operate, maintain, reuse, demolish or deconstruct built infrastructure 
in a sustainable manner. New buildings, structures, and major renovations 
shall be designed and built to conform to the principles in the Federal 
Leadership in High Performance and Sustainable Buildings Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) dated January 24, 2006. Additionally, offerors 
shall provide information documenting a minimum Silver level of the U.S. 
Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) green building system, or an equivalent third party green building 
rating system, with not less than 20% of the total points dedicated toward 




D. FURTHER STUDY 
• What is the proper timeframe for deciding return-on-investment 
decisions for the Navy? Is it 10, 20, or 30 years, and more?  
• Would establishing a strong position in the program office for a 
sustainability manager be able to effectively counter the current 
disincentive that exists for the program manager to make 
investment decisions based upon total ownership cost that raise the 
initial acquisition cost. 
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